however obstinately the idea may have
kept its ground from age to age, still it is simply unmeaning to say that
we seek Knowledge for its own sake, and for nothing else; for that it ever
leads to something beyond itself, which therefore is its end, and the
cause why it is desirable;--moreover, that this end is twofold, either of
this world or of the next; that all knowledge is cultivated either for
secular objects or for eternal; that if it is directed to secular objects,
it is called Useful Knowledge, if to eternal, Religious or Christian
Knowledge;--in consequence, that if, as I have allowed, this Liberal
Knowledge does not benefit the body or estate, it ought to benefit the
soul; but if the fact be really so, that it is neither a physical or a
secular good on the one hand, nor a moral good on the other, it cannot be
a good at all, and is not worth the trouble which is necessary for its
acquisition.
And then I may be reminded that the professors of this Liberal or
Philosophical Knowledge have themselves, in every age, recognized this
exposition of the matter, and have submitted to the issue in which it
terminates; for they have ever been attempting to make men virtuous; or,
if not, at least have assumed that refinement of mind was virtue, and that
they themselves were the virtuous portion of mankind. This they have
professed on the one hand; and on the other, they have utterly failed in
their professions, so as ever to make themselves a proverb among men, and
a laughing-stock both to the grave and the dissipated portion of mankind,
in consequence of them. Thus they have furnished against themselves both
the ground and the means of their own exposure, without any trouble at all
to any one else. In a word, from the time that Athens was the University
of the world, what has Philosophy taught men, but to promise without
practising, and to aspire without attaining? What has the deep and lofty
thought of its disciples ended in but eloquent words? Nay, what has its
teaching ever meditated, when it was boldest in its remedies for human
ill, beyond charming us to sleep by its lessons, that we might feel
nothing at all? like some melodious air, or rather like those strong and
transporting perfumes, which at first spread their sweetness over every
thing they touch, but in a little while do but offend in proportion as
they once pleased us. Did Philosophy support Cicero under the disfavour of
the fickle populace, or nerve Seneca t
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