y routine of method by which these qualities may with
certainty be imparted to every or any understanding. Still, however, we
may safely lay it down that they are not to be got 'by a gatherer of
simples,' but are the combined essence and extracts of many different
things, drawn from much varied reading and discipline, first, and
observation afterwards. For if there be a single intelligible point on
this head, it is that a man who has been trained to think upon one subject
or for one subject only, will never be a good judge even in that one:
whereas the enlargement of his circle gives him increased knowledge and
power in a rapidly increasing ratio. So much do ideas act, not as solitary
units, but by grouping and combination; and so clearly do all the things
that fall within the proper province of the same faculty of the mind,
intertwine with and support each other. Judgment lives as it were by
comparison and discrimination. Can it be doubted, then, whether the range
and extent of that assemblage of things upon which it is practised in its
first essays are of use to its power?
"To open our way a little further on this matter, we will define what we
mean by the power of judgment; and then try to ascertain among what kind
of studies the improvement of it may be expected at all.
"Judgment does not stand here for a certain homely, useful quality of
intellect, that guards a person from committing mistakes to the injury of
his fortunes or common reputation; but for that master-principle of
business, literature, and talent, which gives him strength in any subject
he chooses to grapple with, and enables him to _seize the strong point_ in
it. Whether this definition be metaphysically correct or not, it comes
home to the substance of our inquiry. It describes the power that every
one desires to possess when he comes to act in a profession, or elsewhere;
and corresponds with our best idea of a cultivated mind.
"Next, it will not be denied, that in order to do any good to the
judgment, the mind must be employed upon such subjects as come within the
cognizance of that faculty, and give some real exercise to its
perceptions. Here we have a rule of selection by which the different parts
of learning may be classed for our purpose. Those which belong to the
province of the judgment are religion (in its evidences and
interpretation), ethics, history, eloquence, poetry, theories of general
speculation, the fine arts, and works of wit. G
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