ought by the
ministers too weak to be effective was thought by the colonial
assemblies too strong to be safe. In any case, with hostilities already
begun, the issue could not be pressed to a conclusion when, as the Board
of Trade asserted, "a good understanding between your Majesty's
governors and the people is so absolutely necessary." Under the stress
of war, all ministerial projects for a stricter control of the colonies
were accordingly laid aside until the restoration of peace.

The war itself only proved once more how defective was England's
colonial administration. Three years of devastating Indian warfare again
demonstrated the necessity of an adequate defense of the frontier, and a
stricter control of Indian trade. A customs service which collected
annually L2000 of revenue and cost L7000 to maintain, manned by
officials who sold flags of truce to traders carrying ammunition and
supplies to the enemy, was seen to be but an expensive luxury in time of
peace and a military weakness in time of war. The assistance which Pitt,
and Pitt alone, could induce the colonists to render, however adequate,
was purchased at the price of concessions which deprived the governors
of all but nominal influence, while placing in the assemblies the
effective powers of government. And the results achieved by the Peace of
Paris but confirmed the conclusions which followed from the experience
of the war. The territory then acquired by England was imperial in
extent; and the acquisition of it had in six years raised the annual
cost of her military and naval establishment from L70,000 to L350,000.
This far-flung and diversified empire had to be organized in order to be
governed, and defended in order to be maintained. In view of the
unprecedented responsibilities thus thrust upon the little island
kingdom, it seemed that the oldest and most prosperous, the most English
and best disposed of England's colonies might well be asked to submit to
reasonable restraints in the interests of the empire, and in their own
defense to furnish a moderate assistance.

Before the war was over assiduous royal governors were offering counsel
as to the "regulation of the North American governments." If there is
to be a new establishment "upon a true English constitutional bottom,"
wrote Bernard in 1761, "it must be upon a new plan," for "there is no
system in North America fit to be made a module of." High officials in
England were not lacking who agreed w