one thing most essential
to the right development of individuals, and to the real grandeur of
nations,' it was necessary that its foundations should be made so broad,
in any correct philosophical analysis of its nature, as to comprehend
the whole field of human activity. Accordingly, Mr. Mill includes within
its proper domain the three great departments: consciousness, or the
internal operations of our own minds; will, or the external
manifestation of our thoughts and feelings in acts and habits; and
lastly, association, or cooeperation with others, voluntarily agreed
upon, and not interfering with the rights and liberties of those who may
choose to stand aloof from such combinations. In reference to the first
of these, which asserts the undoubted right to enjoy our own thoughts
and feelings, with absolute freedom of opinion on all subjects, Mr. Mill
remarks that 'the liberty of expressing and publishing opinions may seem
to fall under a different principle, since it belongs to that part of
the conduct of an individual which concerns other people; but being
almost of as much importance as the liberty of thought itself, and
resting in great part on the same reasons, is practically inseparable
from it.' But, in truth, the right of expression, which does not
properly come under the head of consciousness or thought, but under that
of will or action, is the only one of the two which at this day is of
any practical importance. The idea of controlling thought or belief has,
in effect, been everywhere abandoned. Indeed, it may be questioned
whether any such control ever has been or could have been exercised; for
thought itself could never be known except through some outward
manifestation. It was therefore the _expression_ which was punished, and
not the inward consciousness. Opinions, it is true, have too often been
the avowed ground of oppression and persecution. Men have been injured
in various ways, on account of their known or suspected belief; even in
modern times and in communities claiming to be free, political
disabilities, social reprobation, and the stigma of disqualification as
witnesses have been imposed upon persons entertaining certain views on
theological questions. But these persecutions may have compelled the
suppression or disavowal of obnoxious opinions, and may have made
hypocrites; they never changed belief, or produced any other conviction
than that of wrong and outrage. The soul itself is beyond the reach