it, and distinguishes between its real and its apparent
color, its real and its apparent size. He talks about seeing things as
they are, or not seeing things as they are. These distinctions in his
experience of things remain even after he has come to believe in atoms
and molecules.

Thus, the touch object, the tree as he feels it under his hand, may
come to be regarded as the sign of the presence of those entities that
science seems, at present, to regard as ultimate. Does this prevent it
from being the object which has stood as the interpreter of all those
diverse visual sensations that we have called different views of the
tree? They are still the appearances, and it, relatively to them, is
the reality. Now we find that it, in its turn, can be used as a sign
of something else, can be regarded as an appearance of a reality more
ultimate. It is clear, then, that the same thing may be regarded both
as appearance and as reality--appearance as contrasted with one thing,
and reality as contrasted with another.

But suppose one says: _I do not want to know what the real external
world is to this man or to that man; I want to know what the real
external world is_. What shall we say to such a demand?

There is a sense in which such a demand is not purely meaningless,
though it may not be a very sensible demand to make. We have seen that
an increase of knowledge about things compels a man to pass from the
real things of common life to the real things of science, and to look
upon the former as appearance. Now, a man may arbitrarily decide that
he will use the word "reality" to indicate only that which can never in
its turn be regarded as appearance, a reality which must remain an
ultimate reality; and he may insist upon our telling him about that.
How a man not a soothsayer can tell when he has come to ultimate
reality, it is not easy to see.

Suppose, however, that we could give any one such information. We
should then be telling him about things _as they are_, it is true, but
his knowledge of things would not be different in _kind_ from what it
was before. The only difference between such a knowledge of things and
a knowledge of things not known to be ultimate would be that, in the
former case, it would be recognized that no further extension of
knowledge was possible. The distinction between appearance and reality
would remain just what it was in the experience of the plain man.

22. THE BUGBEAR OF THE "UNKN