hat
his House of Commons should Fetter him beyond any of his Predecessors?
_where the Interest goes, you will say, there goes the power_. But the
most ingenious of your Authors, I mean _Plato Redivivus,_ broaches no
such principle as that you should force this Prerogative from the King,
by undue courses. The best use which can be made of all, is rather to
support the Monarchy, than to have it fall upon your Heads. If indeed
there were any reasonable fear of an Arbitrary Government, the adverse
Party had somewhat to alledge in their defence of not supplying it; but
it is not only evident, that the Kings temper is wholly averse from any
such Design, but also demonstrable, that if all his Council, were such
as this man most falsely suggests them to be, yet the notion of an
absolute power in the Prince is wholly impracticable, not only in this
Age, but for ought any wise man can foresee, at any time hereafter. 'Tis
plain, that the King has reduc'd himself already to live more like a
private Gentleman than a Prince; and since he can content himself in
that condition, 'tis as plain, that the supplies which he demands are
only for the service of the publick, and not for his own maintenance.
Monsieur _de Sully_ might give what Council he thought convenient for
_Henry_ the Fourth, who was then designing that Arbitrary power, which
his Successors have since compass'd, to the ruine of the Subjects
liberty in _France_; but I appeal to the Consciences of those men, who
are most averse to the present Government, if they think our King would
put his Peace and Quiet at this time of day, upon so desperate an issue.
What the necessities, which they are driving him into, may make him part
with on the other hand, I know not. But how can they answer it to our
Posterity, that for private Picques, self Interest, and causeless
jealousies, they would destroy the foundation of so excellent a
Government, which is the admiration and envy of all _Europe_?

_The rest of my Authors Paragraph, is only laying more load upon the
Ministers, and telling us, that if a sum of Money sufficient for those
ends were given, while they were Managers of Affairs, it would be only
to set them free from any apprehensions of account to any future
Parliament_. But this Argument having only the imaginary fear of an
Arbitrary power for its foundation, is already answer'd, he adds in the
close of it, _That the Prince has a cheap bargain, who gives Paper-Laws
in exchange o