known to be an
indulgent Prince, to the Consciences of his dissenting Subjects: But
whoever has seen a Paper call'd, I think, _An intended Bill for
uniting_, &c. which lay upon the Table of every Coffee-House, and was
modelling to pass the House of Commons, may have found things of such
dangerous concernment to the Government, as might seem not so much
intended to unite Dissenters in a Protestant Church, as to draw together
all the Forces of the several Fanatick Parties, against the Church of
_England_. And when they were encouraged by such a Vote, which they
value as a Law; (for so high that Coin is now inhaunc'd) perhaps it is
not unreasonable to hold the Rod over them. But for my own part, I
heartily wish, that there may be no occasion for Christians to persecute
each other. And since my Author speaks with some moderation, candor, and
submission to his Mother Church, I shall only desire him and the
dissenting Party, to make the use they ought, of the King Gracious
Disposition to them, in not yet proceeding with all the violence which
the penal Laws require against them. But this calm of my Author, was too
happy to last long. You find him immediately transported into a storm
about the business of _Fitz-Harris_, which occasion'd the Dissolution of
the Parliament at _Oxford_: and accusing, according to his sawcy Custom,
both his Majesty, and the House of Lords, concerning it. As for the
House of Lords, they have already vindicated their own right, by
throwing out the Impeachment: and sure the People of _England_ ought to
own them as the Assertors of the publick Liberty in so doing; for
Process being before ordered against him at Common Law, and no
particular Crime being laid to his Charge by the House of Commons, if
they had admitted his Cause to be tryed before the Lordships, this would
have grown a President in time, that they must have been forc'd to judge
all those whom the House of Commons would thrust upon them, till at last
the number of Impeachments would be so increas'd; that the Peers would
have no time for any other business of the Publick: and the Highest
Court of Judicature would have been reduc'd to be the Ministers of
Revenge to the Commons. What then would become of our ancient Privilege
to be tryed _per pares_? Which in process of time would be lost to us
and our posterity: except a proviso were made on purpose, that this
judgment might not be drawn into farther President; and that is never
done, but whe