ore, that they have a very good excuse
for doing all the work of this faction, when they have no personal
connection with Lord Bute. But whoever becomes a party to an
Administration, composed of insulated individuals, without faith
plighted, tie, or common principle; an Administration constitutionally
impotent, because supported by no party in the nation; he who contributes
to destroy the connections of men and their trust in one another, or in
any sort to throw the dependence of public counsels upon private will and
favour, possibly may have nothing to do with the Earl of Bute. It
matters little whether he be the friend or the enemy of that particular
person. But let him be who or what he will, he abets a faction that is
driving hard to the ruin of his country. He is sapping the foundation of
its liberty, disturbing the sources of its domestic tranquillity,
weakening its government over its dependencies, degrading it from all its
importance in the system of Europe.

It is this unnatural infusion of a _system of Favouritism_ into a
Government which in a great part of its constitution is popular, that has
raised the present ferment in the nation. The people, without entering
deeply into its principles, could plainly perceive its effects, in much
violence, in a great spirit of innovation, and a general disorder in all
the functions of Government. I keep my eye solely on this system; if I
speak of those measures which have arisen from it, it will be so far only
as they illustrate the general scheme. This is the fountain of all those
bitter waters of which, through a hundred different conducts, we have
drunk until we are ready to burst. The discretionary power of the Crown
in the formation of Ministry, abused by bad or weak men, has given rise
to a system, which, without directly violating the letter of any law,
operates against the spirit of the whole constitution.

A plan of Favouritism for our executory Government is essentially at
variance with the plan of our Legislature. One great end undoubtedly of
a mixed Government like ours, composed of Monarchy, and of controls, on
the part of the higher people and the lower, is that the Prince shall not
be able to violate the laws. This is useful indeed and fundamental. But
this, even at first view, is no more than a negative advantage; an armour
merely defensive. It is therefore next in order, and equal in
importance, _that the discretionary powers which are necessa