nquisitive and distinguishing Parliament; because it does inquire, and
does distinguish. If they act well, they know that, in such a
Parliament, they will be supported against any intrigue; if they act ill,
they know that no intrigue can protect them. This situation, however
awful, is honourable. But in one hour, and in the self-same Assembly,
without any assigned or assignable cause, to be precipitated from the
highest authority to the most marked neglect, possibly into the greatest
peril of life and reputation, is a situation full of danger, and
destitute of honour. It will be shunned equally by every man of
prudence, and every man of spirit.

Such are the consequences of the division of Court from the
Administration; and of the division of public men among themselves. By
the former of these, lawful Government is undone; by the latter, all
opposition to lawless power is rendered impotent. Government may in a
great measure be restored, if any considerable bodies of men have honesty
and resolution enough never to accept Administration, unless this
garrison of _King's_ meat, which is stationed, as in a citadel, to
control and enslave it, be entirely broken and disbanded, and every work
they have thrown up be levelled with the ground. The disposition of
public men to keep this corps together, and to act under it, or to co-
operate with it, is a touchstone by which every Administration ought in
future to be tried. There has not been one which has not sufficiently
experienced the utter incompatibility of that faction with the public
peace, and with all the ends of good Government; since, if they opposed
it, they soon lost every power of serving the Crown; if they submitted to
it they lost all the esteem of their country. Until Ministers give to
the public a full proof of their entire alienation from that system,
however plausible their pretences, we may be sure they are more intent on
the emoluments than the duties of office. If they refuse to give this
proof, we know of what stuff they are made. In this particular, it ought
to be the electors' business to look to their Representatives. The
electors ought to esteem it no less culpable in their Member to give a
single vote in Parliament to such an Administration, than to take an
office under it; to endure it, than to act in it. The notorious
infidelity and versatility of Members of Parliament, in their opinions of
men and things, ought in a particular manner to b