e of this service by nature, nor in
any instance called to it by the Constitution. I reverentially look up
to the opinion of the people, and with an awe that is almost
superstitious. I should be ashamed to show my face before them, if I
changed my ground, as they cried up or cried down men, or things, or
opinions; if I wavered and shifted about with every change, and joined in
it, or opposed, as best answered any low interest or passion; if I held
them up hopes, which I knew I never intended, or promised what I well
knew I could not perform. Of all these things they are perfect sovereign
judges without appeal; but as to the detail of particular measures, or to
any general schemes of policy, they have neither enough of speculation in
the closet, nor of experience in business, to decide upon it. They can
well see whether we are tools of a court, or their honest servants. Of
that they can well judge; and I wish that they always exercised their
judgment; but of the particular merits of a measure I have other
standards. That the frequency of elections proposed by this bill has a
tendency to increase the power and consideration of the electors, not
lessen corruptibility, I do most readily allow; so far as it is
desirable, this is what it has; I will tell you now what it has not: 1st.
It has no sort of tendency to increase their integrity and public spirit,
unless an increase of power has an operation upon voters in elections,
that it has in no other situation in the world, and upon no other part of
mankind. 2nd. This bill has no tendency to limit the quantity of
influence in the Crown, to render its operation more difficult, or to
counteract that operation, which it cannot prevent, in any way
whatsoever. It has its full weight, its full range, and its uncontrolled
operation on the electors exactly as it had before. 3rd. Nor, thirdly,
does it abate the interest or inclination of Ministers to apply that
influence to the electors: on the contrary, it renders it much more
necessary to them, if they seek to have a majority in parliament, to
increase the means of that influence, and redouble their diligence, and
to sharpen dexterity in the application. The whole effect of the bill is
therefore the removing the application of some part of the influence from
the elected to the electors, and further to strengthen and extend a court
interest already great and powerful in boroughs; here to fix their
magazines and places of arms,