execute this trust but very imperfectly; and,
if deviating to the least excess, will certainly frustrate instead of
forwarding the purposes of a control on Government. But when the House
of Commons was to be new modelled, this principle was not only to be
changed, but reversed. Whist any errors committed in support of power
were left to the law, with every advantage of favourable construction, of
mitigation, and finally of pardon; all excesses on the side of liberty,
or in pursuit of popular favour, or in defence of popular rights and
privileges, were not only to be punished by the rigour of the known law,
but by a _discretionary_ proceeding, which brought on _the loss of the
popular object itself_. Popularity was to be rendered, if not directly
penal, at least highly dangerous. The favour of the people might lead
even to a disqualification of representing them. Their odium might
become, strained through the medium of two or three constructions, the
means of sitting as the trustee of all that was dear to them. This is
punishing the offence in the offending part. Until this time, the
opinion of the people, through the power of an Assembly, still in some
sort popular, led to the greatest honours and emoluments in the gift of
the Crown. Now the principle is reversed; and the favour of the Court is
the only sure way of obtaining and holding those honours which ought to
be in the disposal of the people.

It signifies very little how this matter may be quibbled away. Example,
the only argument of effect in civil life, demonstrates the truth of my
proposition. Nothing can alter my opinion concerning the pernicious
tendency of this example, until I see some man for his indiscretion in
the support of power, for his violent and intemperate servility, rendered
incapable of sitting in parliament. For as it now stands, the fault of
overstraining popular qualities, and, irregularly if you please,
asserting popular privileges, has led to disqualification; the opposite
fault never has produced the slightest punishment. Resistance to power
has shut the door of the House of Commons to one man; obsequiousness and
servility, to none.

Not that I would encourage popular disorder, or any disorder. But I
would leave such offences to the law, to be punished in measure and
proportion. The laws of this country are for the most part constituted,
and wisely so, for the general ends of Government, rather than for the
preservation of