f territory. But
the German staff believed that the capture of the ancient fortress of
Verdun would have a powerful effect on public opinion at home and
abroad. As a military operation they were confident that such a
victory might have a decisive effect on the future of the war. It was
hoped that the French army, already weakened, would receive a crushing
blow from which it could never recover. An intelligent German prisoner
explained the German point of view: "Verdun sticks into our side like
a dagger, though sheathed. With that weapon threatening our vitals,
how can we think of rushing on France elsewhere? If we had done so,
the Verdun dagger might have stabbed us in the back as well as in the
side."

In order to sustain the German people's faith in the Hohenzollern
dynasty there was urgent necessity that the crown prince should gain a
success. The capture of Verdun would reestablish his somewhat
tarnished military reputation and might force an exhausted France to
sue for peace.

The loss of Verdun and its girdle of forts would have made the
situation of the defenders very difficult, they would find it a
serious problem to hold back the German hosts while organizing a new
line of defense from St. Mihiel to Ste. Menehould. Moreover as the
German lines formed a semicircle around the French position at Verdun
an immense number of guns could be massed against a small area.

In the matter of railway facilities the Germans had every advantage.
They possessed fourteen strategic lines, while the French had only one
ordinary double line, which was in easy range of the German guns
south of Vauquois, and a narrow gauge from Verdun to Bar-le-Duc. This
terrible handicap was in time overcome by the French, who brought to
perfection a system of motor transport by road that enabled them at a
moment's notice to bring up men, ammunition, and supplies to the
defense of Verdun.

The French positions around the fortress had not greatly changed since
the closing months of 1914, when the French carried the village of
Brabant and Haumont Wood and occupied the southeast corner of
Consenvoye Wood. Two formidable natural barriers had been secured by
the Germans: Forges Wood on the left, a long crest east and west
confronting the French lines and bisected its full length by a ravine.
Protected from French fire from the south, it afforded an excellent
artillery position, while the trees served as a screen against aerial
observation. The pos