cattle alike, and moved vast quantities of supplies,
equipment, and valuables of all kinds, the time and the facilities at
their disposal were so insufficient that the victorious German armies
were bound to find still untold quantities of all these. The outbreak
of winter, it is true, finally halted the German advance, the force of
which gradually would have spent itself anyhow on account of the
ever-lengthening lines of communication with its bases. In spite of
this, however, it is next to miraculous that the Russians were at all
able to form a new line and to withdraw beyond this line, after all,
the largest part of their forces. This accomplishment was only a
renewed proof of the remarkable ability of the Russian leaders at
least along one line--the orderly withdrawal of immense masses. It
also showed once more the wonderful resiliency of the Russian armies
and the immense advantages which are to be derived from a practically
inexhaustible supply of men.

Almost as remarkable as the compactness and efficiency of the Russian
retreat was the swiftness and insistency of the German advance.
Throughout the German offensive leading up to and following the fall
of Warsaw the German armies in the north and center of the eastern
front cooperated closely with the Austrian forces in the south. This
must be borne in mind as well as the fact that for this entire
campaign the General Staffs of the Central Powers had conceived one
plan, according to which all their armies proceeded. This frequently
necessitated the halting of the advance on one or more points in order
to enable some other army at some other point to overcome obstacles
which had proved more difficult. Considering the immense extent of the
eastern front--which from considerably over 700 miles at the
beginning of August, 1915, gradually shortened to about 600 miles by
the end of October, 1915--it is little short of marvelous that the
German-Austrian offensive should at no time have lost its cohesion. In
order to get a clearer perspective of the somewhat complicated
operations of a large number of separate army units, we will divide
the entire eastern front into three sections and follow separately the
operations of each.

In the north--from the Gulf of Riga to Novo Georgievsk--Marshal von
Hindenburg was in command. Under him there were four armies, each
under a German general: that under Von Buelow in the extreme north;
that under Von Eichhorn to the south of the fo