itain could have nothing to say;
their importance is that while the negotiations were pending, Austria,
Prussia, and Russia all had a strong motive for standing well with
France. Bonaparte's attitude towards Switzerland was, in so far as it
was backed by force, an infringement of the treaty of Luneville, to
which, however, Great Britain was not a party. The neutrality of
Piedmont had not been safeguarded either at Luneville or at Amiens; it
had already been occupied by France before the treaty was signed, and
Napoleon claimed to have as much right to annex territory in Europe
without the consent of Great Britain as Great Britain had to annex
territory in India without the consent of France.

Napoleon's schemes of colonial expansion, though equally within the
letter of the treaty, were not less disconcerting. The reconquest of San
Domingo appeared necessary in order to obtain a base for the effective
occupation of the new French possession, Louisiana. The despatch of an
expedition for this purpose in December, 1801, had excited grave
suspicion, and when two-thirds of the army had died of yellow fever and
the remainder had returned home, fresh troops were sent out to take
their place. A new naval expedition was prepared in the Dutch port of
Helvoetsluis, but it was impossible to persuade British public opinion
that its real destination was San Domingo. Finally, on the eve of
hostilities, in the spring of 1803 Napoleon, despairing of advance in
this direction and disregarding the Spanish right of pre-emption, sold
Louisiana to the United States for 80,000,000 francs. Still more
embarrassing was Bonaparte's eastern policy. In September, 1802, Colonel
Sebastiani was sent as "commercial agent" to the Levant. He was
instructed to inspect the condition of ports and arsenals, to assure the
sheykhs of French favour, and to report on the military resources of
Syria, Egypt, and the north African coast. His report, which was
published in the _Moniteur_ of January 30, 1803, set forth the
opportunities that France would possess in the event of an immediate
return to hostilities, and was naturally interpreted as disclosing an
intention to renew the war on the first opportunity. Six thousand French
would, he said, be enough to reconquer Egypt; the country was in favour
of France. In March, 1803, Decaen left France with open instructions to
receive the surrender of the five towns in India restored to France, but
with secret orders to inv