y, and it was felt in consequence that the sacrifices
already made were made in vain.

In September, 1802, Lord Whitworth was sent as ambassador extraordinary
to the French Republic. The instructions which he carried with him from
Hawkesbury fully reflect the prevailing spirit of mistrust. He was to
watch for any new leagues which might prejudice England or disturb
Europe; he was to discover any secret designs that might be formed
against the East or West Indies; he was to maintain the closest
surveillance over the internal politics of France, but especially over
the dispositions of influential personages in the confidence of the
first consul, as well as over the financial resources and armaments of
the republic.[8] Two months later, he was expressly warned in a secret
despatch not in any way to commit His Majesty to a restoration of Malta,
even if the provisions made at Amiens for this purpose could be
completely executed; and the principle was laid down, from which the
British government never swerved, that Great Britain was entitled to
compensation for any acquisitions made by France since the treaty was
signed. Accordingly, the retention of Malta was justified as a
counterpoise to French extensions of territory in Italy, the invasion of
Switzerland, and the continued occupation of the Batavian republic.[9]
This resolution was naturally confirmed by the publication of
Sebastiani's report.

[Pageheading: _NAPOLEON AND WHITWORTH._]

The long negotiations between Whitworth and the French government,
during the winter of 1802 and the spring of 1803, only bring into
stronger relief the importance of the issues thus raised, and the
hopelessness of a pacific solution. Napoleon firmly took his stand
throughout on the simple letter of the treaty, which pledged Great
Britain, upon certain conditions, to place the knights of St. John in
possession of Malta, but did not contemplate the case of further
accessions of French territory on the continent. Although the conditions
specified were never fully satisfied, it is abundantly clear that the
British ministers, having at last grasped the value of Malta, created
all the difficulties in their power, and determined to cancel this
article of the treaty. They alleged, in self-defence, that the spirit of
the treaty had been constantly violated by Napoleon, in repeated acts of
hostility to British subjects, in the refusal of all redress for such
grievances, and, above all, in that se