es of Col. Ohr,
who thereupon addressed them as follows:

"Gentleman, have your men stack arms where they now are, and at once
prepare their dinner. They can disperse to get wood and water, but
caution them strictly not to wander far from the gun stacks. We may
possibly pass the night here, but we may be called on, at any moment,
to fall in and resume the march. That's all, gentlemen."

While the Colonel was giving these instructions, I thought a sort of
unusual twinkle sparkled in his eyes, as they rested on me. But, for my
part, I was never more serious in my life. Returning to the company, I
gave the order to stack arms, which being done, the boys crowded around
me, plying me with questions. "What did the Colonel say? What's up,
Stillwell?" I assumed a prodigiously fierce and authoritative look and
said: "Say, do you fellows suppose that we commanding officers of
companies are going to give away to a lot of lousy privates a
confidential communication from the Colonel? If you are guilty of any
more such impertinent conduct, I'll have every mother's son of you
bucked and gagged." The boys all laughed, and after a little more fun
of that kind, I repeated to them literally every word the Colonel said,
and then we all set about getting dinner. About this time Lieut.
Wallace rode up in an ambulance--and my reign was over. We resumed the
march at 3 o'clock in the morning of the next day (May 23rd), marched
18 miles, and bivouacked that night at Peach Orchard Gap. This was no
town, simply a natural feature of the country. Left here next morning
(the 24th) at daylight, marched 18 miles, and bivouacked on a stream
called Little Cadron. Left at daylight next morning (the 25th), marched
18 miles, and went into camp near the town of Springfield. By this time
the intelligence had filtered down to the common soldiers as to the
object of this expedition. It was to intercept, and give battle to, a
force of Confederate cavalry, under Gen. J. O. Shelby, operating
somewhere in this region, and supposed to have threatening designs on
the Little Rock and Devall's Bluff railroad. But so far as encountering
the Confederates was concerned, the movement was an entire failure. My
experience during the war warrants the assertion, I think, that it is
no use to send infantry after cavalry. It is very much like a man on
foot trying to run down a jack-rabbit. It may be that infantry can
sometimes head off cavalry, and thereby frustrate an intended