the sake of rewards and of reputation, but in themselves are
disagreeable and rather to be avoided.

I know, I said, that this is their manner of thinking, and that this
was the thesis which Thrasymachus was maintaining just now, when he
censured justice and praised injustice. But I am too stupid to be
convinced by him.

I wish, he said, that you would hear me as well as him, and then I
shall see whether you and I agree. For Thrasymachus seems to me, like
a snake, to have been charmed by your voice sooner than he ought to
have been; but to my mind the nature of justice and injustice have not
yet been made clear. Setting aside their rewards and results, I want
to know what they are in themselves, and how they inwardly work in the
soul. If you, please, then, I will revive the argument of
Thrasymachus. And first I will speak of the nature and origin of
justice according to the common view of them. Secondly, I will show
that all men who practise justice do so against their will, of
necessity, but not as a good. And thirdly, I will argue that there is
reason in this view, for the life of the unjust is after all better far
than the life of the just--if what they say is true, Socrates, since I
myself am not of their opinion. But still I acknowledge that I am
perplexed when I hear the voices of Thrasymachus and myriads of others
dinning in my ears; and, on the other hand, I have never yet heard the
superiority of justice to injustice maintained by any one in a
satisfactory way. I want to hear justice praised in respect of itself;
then I shall be satisfied, and you are the person from whom I think
that I am most likely to hear this; and therefore I will praise the
unjust life to the utmost of my power, and my manner of speaking will
indicate the manner in which I desire to hear you too praising justice
and censuring injustice. Will you say whether you approve of my
proposal?

Indeed I do; nor can I imagine any theme about which a man of sense
would oftener wish to converse.

I am delighted, he replied, to hear you say so, and shall begin by
speaking, as I proposed, of the nature and origin of justice.

GLAUCON

They say that to do injustice is, by nature, good; to suffer injustice,
evil; but that the evil is greater than the good. And so when men have
both done and suffered injustice and have had experience of both, not
being able to avoid the one and obtain the other, they think that they
had better agree amo