f a stick without the other. Now, if we
consider anything which is quantitatively measured, such as a straight
line, we may consider it, in the first place, as one. In that case it
is a continuous indivisible unit. Next we may regard it as many, in
which case it falls into parts. Now each of these parts may again be
regarded as one, and as such is an indivisible unit; and again each
part may be regarded as many, in which case it falls into further
parts; and this alternating process may go on for ever. This is the
view of the matter which gives rise to the contradictions we have been
considering. But it is a false view. It involves the false abstraction
of first regarding the many as something that has reality apart from
the one, and then regarding the one as something that has reality
apart from the many. If you persist in saying that the line is simply
one and not many, then there arises the theory of indivisible units.
If you {60} persist in saying it is simply many and not one, then it
is divisible _ad infinitum_. But the truth is that it is neither simply
many nor simply one; it is a many in one, that is, it is a _quantity_.
Both sides of the contradiction are, therefore, in one sense true, for
each is a factor of the truth. But both sides are also false, if and
in so far as, each sets itself up as the whole truth.

Critical Remarks on Eleaticism.

The consideration of the meaning of Zeno's doctrine will give us an
insight into the essentials of the position of the Eleatics. Zeno said
that motion and multiplicity are not real. Now what does this mean?
Did Zeno mean to say that when he walked about the streets of Elea, it
was not true that he walked about? Did he mean that it was not a fact
that he moved from place to place? When I move my arms, did he mean
that I am not moving my arms, but that they really remain at rest all
the time? If so, we might justly conclude that this philosophy is a
mere craze of speculation run mad, or else a joke. But this is not
what is meant. The Eleatic position is that though the world of sense,
of which multiplicity and motion are essential features, may exist,
yet that outward world is not the true Being. They do not deny that
the world exists. They do not deny that motion exists or that
multiplicity exists. These things no sane man can deny. The existence
of motion and multiplicity is, as Hegel says, as sensuously certain as
the existence of elephants. Zeno, then, does not de