other people. He knew, as Plato did, that the day of ultimate, universal
happiness will dawn rather when all other people become like
philosophers. In the meantime, it is the height of moral and political
folly to act as if that day had arrived or else could be ushered in by
morning. Spinoza had nothing but contempt for facile-tongued,
feather-brained Utopians. He loved humanity too sincerely to mislead
humanity or himself that way. And so we find in Spinoza's _Ethics_ as in
his _Tractatus_ two systems of morals--one for the many who are called,
and one for the few who are chosen. In the _Tractatus_, the religion of
the many is summarily called "obedience"; in the _Ethics_ it is more
fully shown to consist of utilitarianism in the conduct of our affairs,
high-mindedness towards our fellows, and piety towards Nature or God. To
this is added, as the rare religion of the few, what is designated in
both treatises alike as the intellectual love of Nature or God.
X
Spinoza's religion is as naturalistic as his ethics. By making God and
Nature equivalent terms Spinoza was not merely resorting to equivocation
to escape the penalty of his views. The identification of God and Nature
fully embodies Spinoza's doctrine that there is no supernatural realm;
and therefore if man is to have a God at all, Nature must be that God.
To contend, as so many do, that "true religion" must be based upon the
existence of a supernatural realm, no matter whether or not such a realm
exists, is as absurd as to contend that "true morality" must be based
upon man's "free-will" no matter whether or not man has "free-will."
Spinoza's system has been called pantheistic. But it is pantheistic only
in the sense that whatever man considers Godlike must be found in
Nature, for no other realm exists, and there are no gods.
But the question is always raised, how is it possible to love a Being
indifferent to our human miseries and blind to our hopes? How is even an
intellectual love of such a Being possible? Man, as his religions show,
wants God to be a father, a protector, One who cherishes man's desires
and cares for his wants. The least anthropomorphic of religions wants
God to be the depository of abstract human ideals. But Spinoza's God is
not even as human as this. Nature does not constitute the ideal type for
man.
Religion is, it is true, man's search for comfort and security in an
alien and hostile world. The simple demand of the human heart is t
|