efly of cruisers of from three to four thousand tons, and of
gunboats under two thousand tons; but, acting upon the secretary's
report, Congress, on June 10, 1890, authorized, in addition to another
armored cruiser, three seagoing coast-line battle-ships. These were an
entirely new class of vessels in the United States navy, and their
authorization marks another distinct step in its reconstruction.

An appropriation was made in 1891 for an additional armored cruiser,
designed to be a sister ship to the one provided for in 1890. It was
the purpose to make these vessels more powerful than any of their type
in the navy. Their tonnage was fixed at 7,500, and their maximum speed
at twenty-two knots. They were to be given coal capacity that would
enable them to cruise for great distances without recoaling. This, it
will be seen, is an important advantage to a navy so destitute of
coaling-stations abroad as that of the United States.

The vessels under construction in 1891 were the monitors "Puritan,"
"Amphitrite," "Monadnock," and "Terror," which had been begun in 1874,
but had been neglected in subsequent years; the "Maine," the "Texas,"
the coast-defence vessel "Monterey," which was launched in 1891; the
"New York," "Cincinnati," "Raleigh," "Detroit," and a practice-ship,
which had been authorized by the act of 1887; the harbor-defence ram
"Katahdin;" and gunboats "5" and "6," authorized in 1889; the three
battle-ships, "Indiana," "Massachusetts," and "Oregon," and the
protected cruiser "No. 12," authorized by the act of 1890; and
protected cruiser "No. 13," provided for in 1891.

Three vessels, the "Newark," the "Concord," and the "Bennington," were
given their trial trips in 1890. The behavior of the "Newark" proved
her to be a valuable addition to the list of cruisers. The "Concord"
and the "Bennington," vessels of the gunboat class, similar to the
"Yorktown," also gave evidences of power and usefulness. They carry a
comparatively heavy battery, while their light draught enables them to
run into shallow rivers and bays, and thus perform services for which
larger vessels are incapacitated.

The subject of the organization of a naval militia or reserve had been
discussed for some time before Secretary Tracy assumed his office. He
forcibly urged the necessity of such an organization in his first and
in following annual reports, until, in 1891, Congress appropriated
$25,000 for arms for the militia. This was a decided imp