ur hands. While still pursuing the
retreating enemy, therefore, the cavalry had been directed to make
Junction Station their next objective.
The portion of the enemy's force that had withdrawn into the hills
towards Hebron now made a descent from the hills to the Plain. Their
object was to threaten the flank of our pursuing cavalry, create a
diversion, and thus relieve the pressure from their main body. From
Hebron, a couple of difficult tracks wind down the mountains to the
village of Beit Jibrin, where they join a road coming from Bethlehem and
Jerusalem. This latter road reaches the Plain and Beersheba railway at
Arak el Menshiyeh. This was the spot, then, towards which the
counter-attack, or demonstration from the hills, was organized.
"It was obvious that the Hebron force, which was believed to be short
of transport and ammunition, to have lost heavily, and to be in a
generally disorganized state, could make no effective diversion, and
that this threat could practically be disregarded. The Imperial Camel
Corps, however, was ordered to move to the neighbourhood of Tel el
Nejile, where it would be on the flank of any counterstroke from the
hills; while orders were issued for the main pursuit to be pressed so
that Junction Station might be reached with all speed. The Hebron group
made an ineffective demonstration in the direction of Arak el Menshiyeh
on the 10th, and then retired north-east so as to prolong the enemy's
line towards Beit Jibrin."
Close to the sea, the advance-guard of the 52nd Division pushed on as
far as Burkah on the 11th, and, on the 12th, the yeomanry pushed north
and seized Tel el Murreh, on the right or northern bank of the Nahr
Sukereir and close to its mouth.
"The operations of these days showed a stiffening of the enemy's
resistance on the general line of the Wadi Sukereir, with centre about
El Kustineh. Reports from the R.F.C. indicated the total hostile forces
opposed to us on this line at about 15,000; and this increased
resistance, coupled with the capture of prisoners from almost every unit
of the Turkish force, tended to show that we were no longer opposed to
rearguards, but that all the remainder of the Turkish Army, which could
be induced to fight, was making a last effort to arrest our pursuit
south of the important Junction Station.
"On the morning of the 13th November, the situation was, that the enemy
had strung out his force on a front of 20 miles from El Kubeibeh on the
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