projectory, were, at this stage, found to be of little use. During later
stages of this mountain warfare, the 18-pounder came again into its own;
but that was when suitable positions could be chosen deliberately, and
when, through the length of the range or the use of reduced charges,
they were able to drop their shells with a steep angle of descent. A
high velocity gun, with a flat projectory, like our 18-pounder, has two
disadvantages in mountain warfare. When the gun is firing from behind a
steep hill, the shell, on leaving the gun, is liable to strike the hill
in front instead of clearing the crest. When the projectile reaches the
distant ridge (behind which the enemy are presumably taking cover), the
angle of descent is not sufficiently steep to cause damage. More
satisfactory results were obtainable with howitzers, whose high angle
fire could both clear the forward crests and search the reverse slopes.
Unfortunately, at this time, we had little or no mountain artillery up
forward, while the wheeled guns were often badly handicapped for want of
good roads. We had marched away from Gaza well enough supplied with
artillery for normal or plain country fighting, but scarcely so for this
very different fighting in the mountains.
Another disadvantage under which we laboured, through this abrupt
merging from trench into mountain warfare, was the overloading of the
men. For the latter class of warfare men must be lightly equipped; in
India, even the men's great-coats are carried for them on pack-mules.
Here, the men were, of necessity, loaded up as for trench fighting, and
were carrying gas masks and extra bandoliers (50 rounds) of ammunition,
making a total of 170 rounds per man.
The key to success in modern mountain fighting proved to be the rapidity
with which roads could be constructed for bringing forward artillery.
The defile up to Saris having been piquetted and cleared on the 19th,
Enab was captured on the 20th in the face of organized opposition. Other
infantry had moved from the plain along the more northern track (the
Ajalon Valley route) by Berfilja and Beit Likia, and, on this same 20th,
they captured Beit Dukka. On the same day the yeomanry got to within 4
miles of the Nablus-Jerusalem road, but were stopped by strong
opposition about Beihesnia, 3 or 4 miles west-south-west of Bireh.
In this night it rained, as only in tropical and semi-tropical
countries it knows how. The men, clad in their Indian dri
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