hind
his advanced bases were, therefore, the railway junctions at Deraa and
El Afule, the ford of Jisr ed Damie, and the towns of Beisan, Jenin and
Nazareth.

The broad outline of General Allenby's plan of operations was an attack
in overwhelming force against the enemy's positions on the Maritime
Plain, followed by a right wheel of his left flank on a front of 16
miles from Rafat to the sea, thereby rolling up the Turkish line and
driving them all into the Samaritan hills; meanwhile, his cavalry were
to dash for the tactical points behind the Turkish line and so close all
enemy lines of retreat.

Some weeks before the date fixed for the commencement of operations, the
several Divisions were by turn withdrawn behind the line and put through
a three weeks' course of intensive training. Then a rearrangement of the
line took place, whereby an overwhelming force was concentrated on the
left. The 60th Division, and most of the cavalry, were moved across to
the extreme left from the Jordan Valley. Divisions in the line were so
rearranged that the line from Rafat to the right was only held thinly,
while the garrison of the line from Rafat to the sea was doubled by the
addition of three more Divisions, including the 60th on the sea and a
French Division at Rafat. All these movements were carried out with the
utmost secrecy. The fact that the push was coming along the Maritime
Plain was successfully camouflaged, and the enemy led to believe that
the push would come up the Jordan Valley. The hotel at Jerusalem was
closed, and got in readiness, ostensibly for occupation by G.H.Q. Empty
lorries were run up and down the Jordan Valley. Tents were left standing
there and dummy-horse lines arranged. Dummy horses were left in the
Jordan Valley to convey to enemy aerial observers the impression that
cavalry were still there in strength. All the marching towards the
Jordan Valley was by day; all the marching towards the Maritime Plain
was carried out by night, while by day these troops were hidden in the
olive and orange groves that abound on this portion of the Plain. So
successful were these ruses, and so complete the surprise, that enemy
aerial reconnaissances, made a day before the attack, reported that
there was unusual movement in the Jordan Valley and that there was no
unusual movement on the coastal sector. The whole of the operations were
a triumph of secrecy and of organization.

On the day before the main attack, a small adv