And now let us pass to the question whether expectation ever takes the
form of immediate knowledge. It may, perhaps, be objected that the
anticipation of something future cannot be knowledge at all in the sense
in which the perception of something present or the recollection of
something past is knowledge. But this objection, when examined closely,
appears to be frivolous. Because the future fact has not yet come into
the sphere of actual existence, it is none the less the object of a
perfect assurance.[139]

But, even if it is conceded that expectation is knowledge, the objection
may still be urged that it cannot be immediate, since it is the very
nature of expectation to ground itself on memory. I have already hinted
that this is not the case, and I shall now try to show that what is
called expectation covers much that is indistinguishable from immediate
intuitive certainty, and consequently offers room for an illusory form
of error.

Let us set out with the simplest kind of expectation, the anticipation
of something about to happen within the region of our personal
experience, and similar to what has happened before. And let the coming
of the event be first of all suggested by some present external fact or
sign. Suppose, for example, that the sky is heavy, the air sultry, and
that I have a bad headache; I confidently anticipate a thunderstorm. It
would commonly be said that such an expectation is a kind of inference
from the past. I remember that these appearances have been followed by a
thunderstorm very often, and I infer that they will in this new case be
so followed.

To this, however, it may be replied that in most cases there is no
conscious going back to the past at all. As I have already remarked,
anticipation is pretty certainly in advance of memory in early life. And
even after the habit of passing from the past to the future, from memory
to expectation, has been formed, the number of the past repetitions of
experience would prevent the mind's clearly reverting to them. And,
further, the very force of habit would tend to make the transition from
memory to expectation more and more rapid, automatic, and unconscious.
Thus it comes about that all distinctly suggested approaching events
seem to be expected by a kind of immediate act of belief. The present
signs call up the representation of the coming event with all the force
of a direct intuition. At least, it may be said that if a process of
inference,