d than memory. And so it seems probable that any
mental image which happens to take hold on the mind, if not recognized
as one of memory, or as corresponding to a fact in somebody else's
experience, naturally assumes the form of an expectation of a personal
experience. The force of the expectation will vary in general as the
vividness and persistence of the mental image. Moreover, it follows,
from what has been said, that this force of imagination will determine
what little time-character we ever give to these wholly ungrounded
illusions.
We see, then, that any process of spontaneous imagination will tend to
beget some degree of illusory expectation. And among the agencies by
which such ungrounded imagination arises, the promptings of feeling play
the most conspicuous part. A present emotional excitement may give to an
imaginative anticipation, such as that of the prophetic enthusiast, a
reality which approximates to that of an actually perceived object. And
even where this force of excitement is wanting, a gentle impulse of
feeling may suffice to beget an assurance of a distant reality. The
unknown recesses of the remote future offer, indeed, the field in which
the illusory impulses of our emotional nature have their richest
harvest.
"Thus, from afar, each dim discover'd scene
More pleasing seems than all the past hath been;
And every form, that Fancy can repair
From dark oblivion, glows divinely there."
The recurring emotions, the ruling aspirations, find objects for
themselves in this veiled region. Feelings too shy to burst forth in
unseemly anticipation of the immediate future, modestly satisfy
themselves with this remote prospect of satisfaction. And thus, there
arises the half-touching, half-amusing spectacle of men and women
continually renewing illusory hopes, and continually pushing the date of
their realization further on as time progresses and brings no actual
fruition.
So far I have spoken of such expectations as refer to future personal
experience only. Growing individual experience and the enlargement of
this by the addition of social experience enable us to frame a number of
other beliefs more or less similar to the simple expectations just dealt
with. Thus, for example, I can forecast with confidence events which
will occur in the lives of others, and which I shall not even witness;
or again, I may even succeed in dimly descrying events, such as
political changes or scientific disco
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