to be received as if it were a mathematical demonstration. If the
arguments, whether abstract or otherwise, absolutely demonstrative or
only probable, are supposed to be exactly balanced, there is no reason
for deciding in favor of one side more than the other; and there is,
therefore, no belief, for the very reason that reason cannot
be exercised."
"Very well indeed," said Harrington, "so far as it goes; but I
forthwith see, that, so far from deriving any benefit from this
ingenious reasoning, there is no such thing as either faith or belief:
belief and faith have both vanished at the same time; the first is
resolved into reason, and the second becomes impossible."
"Belief may," said Fellowes, "but faith never. Its divine beauty is
all the brighter, when happily divorced from logic and syllogisms,
its misalliance with which can only be compared to that cruel punishment
by which the living was chained to the dead. Say what you will, it
still reigns and triumphs in the soul in spite of all."
"I am perfectly convinced," said Harrington, "that the modern
spiritualist will not bring his 'faith' into any ignominious slavery
to intellect or syllogism. But clear up my doubts if you can. I know
that the writers you are fond of quoting very generally give an
illustration of the nature of faith by pointing to the ingenuous
trust of a child in the wisdom and kindness of a parent."
"They do; and is it not a beautiful illustration? That is genuine
faith indeed!"
"I am willing to take the illustration. The child has faith, we see,
in his father's superior wisdom and experienced kindness."
"Yes."
"He believes them, therefore."
"Certainly."
"But belief is reason."
"Certainly; but faith is more than that."
"No doubt; but he does believe these things."
"Yes, certainly."
"And if he did not believe them, he would cease to have faith. If,
for instance, he be convinced that his father is mad, or cruel, or
unjust, the state of affections which you call faith will diminish,
and at last cease."
"Perhaps so," said Fellowes.
"Perhaps so, my friend! I really cannot receive your answer, because
I am convinced that it does not express your sentiments."
"Well, I believe that the state of affection which call 'faith' would
be impossible under such circumstances."
"But belief is reason."
"Yes."
"Must we not say, then, that the child's faith depends on the condition
of his belief, that is, on his reason, so
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