nly does not
'work by love'; and which, I think, would be well exchanged for a
dead orthodoxy, or any thing else."
It is not difficult to see the source of the fallacy into which
Mr. Fellowes had fallen. It lies in the attempt to make a
distinction in fact, as well as in theory, between the
"intellectual" and "emotional" parts of our nature. It is very well
for the spiritual and mental analyst to consider separately the
several principles which constitute humanity, and which act, and
react, and interact, in endless involution. That there may be acts
of belief that terminate chiefly in the intellect, and may be wholly
worthless, who denies? The drunkard, for example, may admit that
sobriety is a duty; but yet, if he gets drunk every night of his
life, we shall, of course, think little of that act of belief,--of
his daily repetition of moral orthodoxy. In the same manner, a man
may admit that it is his duty to exercise implicit love, gratitude,
and obedience towards the great object of worship; but if his
habitual conduct shows that he has no thought of acting in accordance
with this maxim, he must be regarded, in spite of the orthodoxy of
his speculative creed, as no better than a heathen; or worse.
But though it is very possible that a true belief may not involve
true faith, does the converse follow,--that therefore true faith is
essentially different from it, and independent of it? All history
shows, that when religion is practical at all,--that is, issues in
faith,--such faith is as the truth or falsehood believed; the emotional
and active conditions of the soul are colored, as usual, by knowledge
and intellect. These, again, are not independent of the will and the
affections, as we all familiarly know. And hence the fallacy of
supposing that no man is to be thought better or worse for his
"intellectual creed." His "creed" may be his "crime"; and surely none
ought to see this more clearly than the writers who deny it; for
why their eternal invectives against "dogmas,"--and especially the
tolerably universal dogmas that men are responsible for the formation
of their opinions,--except upon the supposition that men are
responsible for framing and maintaining them? If they are not, men
should be left alone; if they are, they are to be thought of as
"worse and better" for their "intellectual creed."
Before the conclusion of the conversation, Mr. Fellowes asked me for
my opinion.
"If," said I, "faith be defined in
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