alse or contradictory; in fact,
nothing more difficult to be believed than many undeniable phenomena of
the external universe,--matters, for example, which you acknowledge you
do not comprehend, but which may possibly be true for aught you can
tell to the contrary."
"But if the supposed revelation contain nothing but what, appealing
thus to my judgment, I can approve, where is the necessity of a
revelation at all?"
"Did I say, my friend, that it was to contain nothing but what is
referred to your judgment? nothing but what you would know and approve
just as well without it? or even did I concede that you could have
known and approved without it that which, when it is proposed, you do
approve? I simply wish an answer to the question, whether, if a teacher
of an ethical system such as you entirely approved, with some doctrines
attached, incomprehensible it may be, but not demonstratively false or
immoral, were to substantiate (as he affirmed) his claims to your
belief by the performance of miracles, you would or would not feel
constrained any the more to believe him?"
"But I do not see the use of discussing a question under circumstances
which it is admitted never did nor ever can occur?"
"You 'fight hard,' as Socrates says to one of his antagonists on a
similar occasion; but I really must request an answer to the question.
The case is an imaginable one; and you may surely say how, upon the
principles you have laid down, you think those principles would compel
you to act in the hypothetical case."
"Well, then, if I must give all answer, I should say that upon the
principles on which Mr. Newman has argued the question,--that all
revelation, except which is internal, is impossible,--I should not
believe the supposed envoy's claims."
"Whatever the number or the splendor of his miracles?"
"Certainly," said Fellowes, with some hesitation however, and
speaking slowly.
"For that does not affect the principles we are agreed upon?"
"No,"--not seeming, however, perfectly satisfied.
"Very well," resumed Harrington, "that is what I call a plain answer
to a plain question. I fancy (waverer that I am!) that I should
believe the man's claims. I should be even greatly tempted to think
that those things which I could not entirely see ought to be
contained in the said revelation, were to be believed. But all that
is doubtless only because I am much weaker in mind and will than
either Mr. Newman or yourself. You must
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