" It remained for
Nelson to endeavour to endow it with a tactical function, but his idea was
never realised either by himself or any of his successors.

Side by side with this new element in the organisation of a battle-fleet,
which perhaps is best designated as a "Light Division," we have another
significant fact. Not only was it not always composed entirely of
ships-of-the-line, especially in the French service, but in 1805, the year
of the full development, we have Sir Richard Strachan using the heavy
frigates attached to his battle-squadron as a "Light Division," and giving
them a definite tactical function. The collapse of the French Navy put a
stop to further developments of either idea. Whither they would have led we
cannot tell. But it is impossible to shut our eyes to the indication of a
growing tendency towards the system that exists at present. It is difficult
at least to ignore the fact that both Nelson and Strachan in that
culminating year found the actuality of war calling for something for which
there was then no provision in the constitution of the fleet, but which it
does contain to-day. What Nelson felt for was a battleship of cruiser
speed. What Strachan desired was a cruiser fit to take a tactical part in a
fleet action. We have them both, but with what result? Anson's
specialisation of types has almost disappeared, and our present fleet
constitution is scarcely to be distinguished from that of the seventeenth
century. We retain the three-fold nomenclature, but the system itself has
really gone. Battleships grade into armoured cruisers, armoured cruisers
into protected cruisers. We can scarcely detect any real distinction except
a twofold one between vessels whose primary armament is the gun and vessels
whose primary armament is the torpedo. But even here the existence of a
type of cruiser designed to act with flotillas blurs the outline, while, as
we have seen, the larger units of the flotilla are grading up to cruiser
level.

We are thus face to face with a situation which has its closest counterpart
in the structureless fleets of the seventeenth century. That naval thought
should have so nearly retraced its steps in the course of two centuries is
curious enough, but it is still more striking when we consider how widely
the underlying causes differ in each case. The pressure which has forced
the present situation is due most obviously to two causes. One is the
excessive development of the "intermed