ss by his grave in silence, and leave him the laurels which he
purchased with his death; but I see no reason why he should swell the
number of our fathers' sins, and should neglect an act of justice, which
will, in any case, be performed some day by our grandchildren, and then
perhaps with a smile of pity for us.

Before we go farther it will be necessary to establish, so far as
possible, certain conceptions of art in general, and of the branches of
art cultivated by Koerner and Kleist. I purposely say "so far as
possible;" for it would not be easy to expound a complete conception of
art before one set forth a complete conception of the human soul, of
which art might be called the most comprehensive phenomenon. We must
therefore infer this conception from the effects of art, so far as they
appear; but as these effects are infinite the conception may be
something very different from a barrier erected for the purpose of a
mere provisional designation, which ceases to exist the moment that it
pleases genius to overstep it. We find this possibility confirmed when
we examine how the conception in question has changed in German
literature alone, during the various epochs of its relatively short
history.

In the day of Gessner, Bodmer, and the like, who saw a muse in every
sheep and every herdsman, the imitation of nature was the gospel in
which every one believed. This, at best, meant nothing at all, and
closely analyzed, it is half nonsensical, in so far as this definition
presupposes art to be something that exists outside the domain of
nature. But man belongs within the domain of nature; he must be
included within this domain, and at most can complete or enlarge it;
and for this reason alone art can never imitate a whole of which it is
a part.

Hereupon men went a step farther, and defined art as "imitation of the
beautiful." We should have less cause to object to this definition if
the question on which everything depends in this case had not been left
unanswered; if they had not left undecided what it was they meant by
"imitation of the beautiful." They were indeed very soon ready with an
explanation, calling that "beautiful" which reveals an agreeable unity
in variety. Unfortunately they could not prevail upon themselves to
grant the proposition: "All is beautiful or nothing," which follows
immediately from the first; for they had overlooked the fact that the
word "agreeable" was superfluous, since every unity, becau