eral Massey three times taken prisoner by them, and once
wounded at Worcester.
(3.) Major-General Langhorn, (4.) Colonel Poyer, and (5.) Colonel
Powell, changed sides, and at last taken, could obtain no other favour
than to draw lots for their lives; Colonel Poyer drew the dead lot,
and was shot to death.
(6.) Earl of Holland: who, when the House voted who should be
reprieved, Lord Goring, who had been their worst enemy, or the Earl of
Holland, who excepting one offence, had been their constant servant,
voted Goring to be spared, and the Earl to die.
(7.) The Earl of Essex, their first general;
(8.) Sir William Waller;
(9.) Lieutenant-General Ludlow;
(10.) The Earl of Manchester;
--all disgusted and voted out of the army, though they had stood the
first shock of the war, to make way for the new model of the army, and
introduce a party.
* * * * *
In all these confusions I have observed two great errors, one of the
king, and one of his friends.
Of the king, that when he was in their custody, and at their mercy,
he did not comply with their propositions of peace, before their army,
for want of employment, fell into heats and mutinies; that he did not
at first grant the Scots their own conditions, which, if he had done,
he had gone into Scotland; and then, if the English would have fought
the Scots for him, he had a reserve of his loyal friends, who would
have had room to have fallen in with the Scots to his assistance,
who were after dispersed and destroyed in small parties attempting to
serve him.
While his Majesty remained at Newcastle, the queen wrote to him,
persuading him to make peace upon any terms; and in politics her
Majesty's advice was certainly the best. For, however low he was
brought by a peace, it must have been better than the condition he was
then in.
The error I mention of the king's friends was this, that after they
saw all was lost, they could not be content to sit still, and reserve
themselves for better fortunes, and wait the happy time when the
divisions of the enemy would bring them to certain ruin; but must
hasten their own miseries by frequent fruitless risings, in the face
of a victorious enemy, in small parties; and I always found these
effects from it:--
1. The enemy, who were always together by the ears, when they were let
alone, were united and reconciled when we gave them any interruption;
as particularly, in the case of the firs
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