fluence elections or control the affairs of the nation. But if any
private citizen or public functionary should interpose to curtail its
powers or prevent a renewal of its privileges, it can not be doubted
that he would be made to feel its influence.

Should the stock of the bank principally pass into the hands of the
subjects of a foreign country, and we should unfortunately become
involved in a war with that country, what would be our condition? Of the
course which would be pursued by a bank almost wholly owned by the
subjects of a foreign power, and managed by those whose interests, if
not affections, would run in the same direction there can be no doubt.
All its operations within would be in aid of the hostile fleets and
armies without. Controlling our currency, receiving our public moneys,
and holding thousands of our citizens in dependence, it would be more
formidable and dangerous than the naval and military power of the enemy.

If we must have a bank with private stockholders, every consideration of
sound policy and every impulse of American feeling admonishes that it
should be _purely American_. Its stockholders should be composed
exclusively of our own citizens, who at least ought to be friendly to
our Government and willing to support it in times of difficulty and
danger. So abundant is domestic capital that competition in subscribing
for the stock of local banks has recently led almost to riots. To a bank
exclusively of American stockholders, possessing the powers and
privileges granted by this act, subscriptions for $200,000,000 could be
readily obtained. Instead of sending abroad the stock of the bank in
which the Government must deposit its funds and on which it must rely to
sustain its credit in times of emergency, it would rather seem to be
expedient to prohibit its sale to aliens under penalty of absolute
forfeiture.

It is maintained by the advocates of the bank that its constitutionality
in all its features ought to be considered as settled by precedent and
by the decision of the Supreme Court. To this conclusion I can not
assent. Mere precedent is a dangerous source of authority, and should
not be regarded as deciding questions of constitutional power except
where the acquiescence of the people and the States can be considered as
well settled. So far from this being the case on this subject, an
argument against the bank might be based on precedent. One Congress, in
1791, decided in favor of a bank