e foot of the throne. And therefore (as Lord
Harrowby, the President of the Council, admitted) there could be no
doubt of their right to assemble, so far as was necessary to agree to
their petitions or addresses. It was a right that did not depend on the
Bill of Rights, on which it was usually grounded, but had existed long
before. But this bill," he contended, "imposed no restrictions on the
legitimate enjoyment of that privilege; it only regulated the meetings
at which it was to be exercised." And Lord Liverpool affirmed that the
bill was not only "consistent with the existing laws and principles of
the constitution, but was even proposed in furtherance of those
principles, and for the purpose of protecting the people of this country
against a series of evils which, if not checked, must subvert their laws
and liberties."

In attempting to form a correct judgment on the question whether this
bill were constitutional or unconstitutional, it must, I think, be
admitted that, as has been remarked before, the terms "constitutional"
and "unconstitutional" are somewhat vague and elastic. There is no one
document--not Magna Charta, nor the Petition of Eight, nor the Bill of
Rights--which can be said to contain the whole of the British
constitution. Its spirit and principles are, indeed, to be found in all
the laws, to which they give animation and life, but not in any one law.
And among its leading principles are those which embrace the right of
every individual to freedom of action and freedom of speech, so long as
he does not commit any crime himself, nor tempt others to do so. Yet it
does not follow that a new enactment which for a while abridges or
suspends that freedom of action or speech is inconsistent with those
constitutional principles.

Ministers, to whom the government of a country is intrusted, do wrong if
they limit their operations to the punishment of offences which have
been committed. It is at least equally their duty, as far as possible,
to prevent their commission; to take precautionary measures, especially
at times when there is notorious danger of offences being committed. At
the same time they are bound not to legislate under the influence of
panic; not to yield to fears having no substantial ground. And in their
measures of precaution they are farther bound to depart from or overstep
the ordinary law as little as is compatible with the attainment of their
object. In all such cases each action of theirs