the part of the King; not, probably, so much because
he feared to find in him any desire to depart from the policy of Lord
Liverpool, except on the Catholic question (for even on matters of
foreign policy, on which Canning had always been supposed most to fix
his attention, he had adopted the line which Lord Liverpool had laid
down for the cabinet with evident sincerity),[190] as because his
Majesty had never wholly forgiven him for the attitude which he had
taken, differing on one or two points from that of his colleagues on the
Queen's case. And, as has been mentioned in a former chapter, he even,
with the object of evading the necessity of appointing him, suggested to
the Duke of Wellington the singular scheme of allowing the remaining
members of Lord Liverpool's cabinet to select their own chief,[191]
which the Duke, though coinciding with him in his dislike of Canning, of
whom he entertained a very causeless suspicion, rejected without
hesitation, as an abandonment of the royal prerogative in one of its
most essential duties or privileges. Another of his Majesty's notions,
if it had been carried out, would have been one of the strangest
violations of constitutional principle and practice which it is possible
to conceive. The Duke of York, who had for many years been
Commander-in-chief, died in January of the same year, and on his death
the King actually proposed to take that office on himself. For the
moment Lord Liverpool was able to induce him to abandon the idea, and to
confer the post on the Duke of Wellington. But it had taken such
possession of his mind that he recurred to it again when, on Canning
becoming Prime-minister, the Duke resigned the office; and he pressed it
on the Cabinet with singular pertinacity till, on Canning's death, the
Duke was prevailed on to resume the command. It is evident that no
arrangement could possibly be more inconsistent with every principle of
the constitution. The very foundation of parliamentary government is,
that every officer of every department is responsible to Parliament for
the proper discharge of his duties. But the investiture of the sovereign
with ministerial office of any kind must involve either the entire
withdrawal of that department from parliamentary control, or the
exposure of the sovereign to constant criticism, which, however
essential to the efficiency of the department, and consequently to the
public service, would be wholly inconsistent with the respect d
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