ery citizen and the liberty of all. But it
is no less important to the existence of the nation that these several
powers should have the same origin, should follow the same principles,
and act in the same sphere; in a word, that they should be correlative
and homogeneous. No one, I presume, ever suggested the advantage of
trying offences committed in France by a foreign court of justice, in
order to secure the impartiality of the judges. The Americans form one
people in relation to their Federal Government; but in the bosom of this
people divers political bodies have been allowed to subsist which are
dependent on the national Government in a few points, and independent
in all the rest; which have all a distinct origin, maxims peculiar to
themselves, and special means of carrying on their affairs. To entrust
the execution of the laws of the Union to tribunals instituted by these
political bodies would be to allow foreign judges to preside over the
nation. Nay, more; not only is each State foreign to the Union at
large, but it is in perpetual opposition to the common interests, since
whatever authority the Union loses turns to the advantage of the States.
Thus to enforce the laws of the Union by means of the tribunals of the
States would be to allow not only foreign but partial judges to preside
over the nation.

[Footnote c: Federal laws are those which most require courts of
justice, and those at the same time which have most rarely established
them. The reason is that confederations have usually been formed by
independent States, which entertained no real intention of obeying the
central Government, and which very readily ceded the right of command
to the federal executive, and very prudently reserved the right of
non-compliance to themselves.]

But the number, still more than the mere character, of the tribunals of
the States rendered them unfit for the service of the nation. When the
Federal Constitution was formed there were already thirteen courts of
justice in the United States which decided causes without appeal. That
number is now increased to twenty-four. To suppose that a State can
subsist when its fundamental laws may be subjected to four-and-twenty
different interpretations at the same time is to advance a proposition
alike contrary to reason and to experience.

The American legislators therefore agreed to create a federal judiciary
power to apply the laws of the Union, and to determine certain questions