orcing its laws. Governments
have in general but two means of overcoming the opposition of the people
they govern, viz., the physical force which is at their own disposal,
and the moral force which they derive from the decisions of the courts
of justice.
A government which should have no other means of exacting obedience than
open war must be very near its ruin, for one of two alternatives would
then probably occur: if its authority was small and its character
temperate, it would not resort to violence till the last extremity,
and it would connive at a number of partial acts of insubordination,
in which case the State would gradually fall into anarchy; if it was
enterprising and powerful, it would perpetually have recourse to
its physical strength, and would speedily degenerate into a military
despotism. So that its activity would not be less prejudicial to the
community than its inaction.
The great end of justice is to substitute the notion of right for that
of violence, and to place a legal barrier between the power of the
government and the use of physical force. The authority which is awarded
to the intervention of a court of justice by the general opinion of
mankind is so surprisingly great that it clings to the mere formalities
of justice, and gives a bodily influence to the shadow of the law. The
moral force which courts of justice possess renders the introduction of
physical force exceedingly rare, and is very frequently substituted for
it; but if the latter proves to be indispensable, its power is doubled
by the association of the idea of law.
A federal government stands in greater need of the support of judicial
institutions than any other, because it is naturally weak and exposed
to formidable opposition. *c If it were always obliged to resort to
violence in the first instance, it could not fulfil its task. The Union,
therefore, required a national judiciary to enforce the obedience of the
citizens to the laws, and to repeal the attacks which might be directed
against them. The question then remained as to what tribunals were to
exercise these privileges; were they to be entrusted to the courts of
justice which were already organized in every State? or was it necessary
to create federal courts? It may easily be proved that the Union could
not adapt the judicial power of the States to its wants. The separation
of the judiciary from the administrative power of the State no doubt
affects the security of ev
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