lyzed. No greater evil could befall
a nation.--Translator's Note.]]
One of the principal vices of the elective system is that it always
introduces a certain degree of instability into the internal and
external policy of the State. But this disadvantage is less sensibly
felt if the share of power vested in the elected magistrate is small. In
Rome the principles of the Government underwent no variation, although
the Consuls were changed every year, because the Senate, which was an
hereditary assembly, possessed the directing authority. If the elective
system were adopted in Europe, the condition of most of the monarchical
States would be changed at every new election. In America the President
exercises a certain influence on State affairs, but he does not conduct
them; the preponderating power is vested in the representatives of the
whole nation. The political maxims of the country depend therefore on
the mass of the people, not on the President alone; and consequently
in America the elective system has no very prejudicial influence on the
fixed principles of the Government. But the want of fixed principles is
an evil so inherent in the elective system that it is still extremely
perceptible in the narrow sphere to which the authority of the President
extends.
The Americans have admitted that the head of the executive power, who
has to bear the whole responsibility of the duties he is called upon to
fulfil, ought to be empowered to choose his own agents, and to remove
them at pleasure: the legislative bodies watch the conduct of the
President more than they direct it. The consequence of this arrangement
is, that at every new election the fate of all the Federal public
officers is in suspense. Mr. Quincy Adams, on his entry into office,
discharged the majority of the individuals who had been appointed by his
predecessor: and I am not aware that General Jackson allowed a single
removable functionary employed in the Federal service to retain
his place beyond the first year which succeeded his election. It
is sometimes made a subject of complaint that in the constitutional
monarchies of Europe the fate of the humbler servants of an
Administration depends upon that of the Ministers. But in elective
Governments this evil is far greater. In a constitutional monarchy
successive ministries are rapidly formed; but as the principal
representative of the executive power does not change, the spirit of
innovation is kept within boun
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