lly recognized in this act. The object here, however, was
not to establish judicial control over treaties, but to deprive the
state courts of all authority over them.

The failure of the Supreme Court to exercise the right to annul treaties
is to be explained in part by the fact that the judicial veto was
intended primarily as a check on democracy. From the point of view of
the conservatives who framed the Constitution it was a device for
protecting the classes which they represented against democratic
"excesses" in both the state and Federal government. It was expected
that this tendency would be manifested mainly in the legislation of the
various states and possibly in some slight degree in Congressional
legislation, since the President and Senate would occasionally find it
expedient to yield too largely to the demands of the directly elected
House. But in the case of treaties made by the President and Senate,
both safely removed, as they thought, beyond the reach of popular
influence, there was no obvious need of a conservative check. In
developing the policy of the Federal courts in pursuance of the purpose
of those who framed the Constitution, it was perfectly natural that the
judicial veto should not have been used to limit the treaty-making
power.

But even if the Federal courts had felt inclined to extend their
authority in this direction, the Constitution did not as in the case of
Congressional legislation confer upon them the means of self-protection.
In declaring null and void an act of Congress which did not have the
support of at least two-thirds of the Senate, the Supreme Court is
exercising a power which, if not expressly conferred upon it by the
Constitution, it can at any rate exercise with impunity, since the
majority in the Senate which it thus overrides is not large enough to
convict in case of impeachment. All treaties must have the approval of
two-thirds of the Senate; and since the majority in this body required
to ratify a treaty is the same as that required to convict in
impeachment proceedings, it is readily seen that the Senate has the
constitutional power to prevent judicial annulment of treaties.
Two-thirds of the Senate could not overcome judicial opposition,
however, unless supported by at least a majority in the House of
Representatives. But inasmuch as the Supreme Court is pre-eminently the
representative of conservatism and vested interests, it is likely to
disapprove of the policy of