his, however, is something of
an exaggeration. He is more accurate when he refers to the doctrine as
being as old as the Constitution itself and the outgrowth of the
circumstances of the time. The prevalent conception of the state as a
check upon the Federal government derived support, as we have seen, from
the efforts of the framers of the Constitution themselves to give it an
interpretation that would remove as far as possible the obstacles to its
ratification by allaying the fears and jealousy of the states. The idea
that the state government could oppose and resist an unconstitutional
exercise of authority by the Federal government was widely accepted as a
general principle, although little attention had been given to the
practical application of the doctrine. Jefferson merely gave definite
form to what had been a more or less vague conception by showing how the
constitutional checks upon the Federal government could be made
effective.

The best statement of this doctrine, however, is to be found in the
works of John C. Calhoun, whose Disquisition on Government and
Discourse on the Constitution of the United States are a masterly
defense of the system of checks and balances. He had no sympathy with
what would now be called popular government. His point of view was
essentially aristocratic, and he frankly avowed it.

He recognized the fact that under the existing social organization the
interests of all classes are not the same; that there is a continual
struggle between them; and that any interest or combination of interests
obtaining control of the government will seek their own welfare at the
expense of the rest. This, he claimed, made it necessary to so organize
the government as to give the minority the means of self-protection. To
give to the minority this constitutional power would tend to prevent the
selfish struggle to obtain possession of the government, since it would
deprive the majority of all power to aggrandize themselves at the
expense of the minority. The very essence of constitutional government,
according to his view, was the protection afforded to the minority
through the limitation of the power of the majority. To accomplish the
true end of constitutional government, which is the limitation of the
power of the numerical majority, it is necessary, he contended, that the
various classes or interests should be separately represented, and that
each through its proper organ should have a veto on the