names were proper names,
though they are but words descriptive of the function which the deity
performed or presided over. Yet though these _di indigites_ are gods,
personal gods, to whom prayer and sacrifice are offered, they have no
mythology attached to them; no myths are told about them.
The fact thus forced on our notice by the _di indigites_ of Rome
should be enough to warn us that mythology does not of necessity
spring up, as an immediate consequence of the worship of the gods. It
may even suggest a reason why mythology must be a secondary, rather
than a primary consequence of worship. The Romans were practical, and
so are savages: if they asked the question, 'Why did this god do this
thing?' they asked it in no spirit of speculation but for a practical,
common-sense reason: because they did not want this thing done again.
And they offered sacrifices to the god or goddess, with that end in
view. The things with regard to which the savage community first asks
the question, 'Why did the god do it?' are things disastrous to the
community--plague or famine. The answer to the question is really
implied by the terms in which the question is stated: the community,
or some member of the community has transgressed; he must be
discovered and punished. So long and so far as the question is thus
put and thus answered, there is little room for mythology to grow in.
And it did not grow round the _di indigites_ in Italy, or round
corresponding deities in other countries.
But the question, 'Why did the god do it?' is susceptible, on
reflection, of another kind of answer. And from minds of a more
reflective cast than the Roman, it received answer in the form of
mythology, of aetiological myths. Mythology is the work of reflection:
it is when the community has time and inclination to reflect upon its
gods and their doings that mythology arises in the common
consciousness. For everything which happens to him, early man has one
explanation, if the thing is such as seems to him to require
explanation, and the explanation is that this thing is the doing of
some god. If the thing that arrests attention is some disaster, which
calls for remedy, the community approaches the god with prayer and
sacrifice; its object is practical, not speculative; and no myth
arises. But if the thing that arrests attention is not one which calls
for action, on the part of the community, but one which stimulates
curiosity and provokes reflection, then
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