either that there are now no
principles of correct reasoning or that there were none then; it only
shows that there was, on this point, confusion of thought. So too we
may admit--we have no choice but to admit--that there are spiritual
fallacies, as well as fallacies of logic. Of such are the petitions
which are in form prayers, just as logical fallacies are, in form,
arguments. They may be addressed to the being worshipped, as fallacies
are addressed to the reason; and eventually their fallacious nature
may become evident even to the reason of man. But it is only by the
evolution of prayer, that is by the disclosure of its true nature,
that petitions of the kind in question come to be recognised and
condemned as spiritual fallacies. The petitioner who puts up such
petitions is indeed unconscious of his error, but he errs, for all
that, just as the person who uses a fallacious argument may be
himself the victim of his fallacy: but he errs none the less because
he is deceived himself. There are normative principles of prayer as
well as the normative principles of thought; and both operate 'long
before they come to the surface of human thought and are articulately
expounded.' It is in thinking that the normative principles of thought
emerge. But it is by no means the case that they come to the surface
of every man's thought. So too it is in prayer that the normative
principles of prayer emerge; yet men require teaching how to pray.
Some petitions are permissible, some not.

If then there are normative principles of prayer, just as there are of
action, thought and speech; if there are petitions which are not
permissible, and which are not and never can be prayers, though by a
spiritual fallacy, analogous to logical fallacies, they may be thought
to be prayers, what is it that decides the nature of an admissible
petition? It seems to be the conception of the being to whom the
petition is addressed. Thus it is that prayer throws light on the idea
of God. From the prayers offered we can infer the nature of the idea.
The confusion of admissible and inadmissible petitions points to
confused apprehension of the idea of God. It is not merely imperfect
apprehension but confused apprehension. In polytheism the confusion
betrays itself, because it leads to collision with the principles of
morality: of the gods who make war upon one another, each must be
supposed to hold himself in the right; therefore either some gods do
not know