lise, the feeling with which the community
draws near. So long as it does this, its function is discharged. What
it is of importance to notice, and what is apt to be forgotten, is the
feeling which underlies the outward act, and without which the action,
the rite, would not be performed. The feeling is the desire of the
worshipper to commend himself. If we take this point of view, then the
distinction, which is sometimes drawn between offerings and sacrifice,
need not mislead us. The distinction is that the term 'sacrifice' is
to be used only of that which is consumed, or destroyed, in the
service; while the term 'offering' is to be used only of what is not
destroyed. And the reason for drawing, or seeking to draw, the
distinction, seems to be that the destruction, or consumption, of the
material thing, in the service, is required to prove that the offering
is accepted. But, though this proof may have come, in some cases, to
be expected, as showing that the community was right in believing that
the offering would be acceptable; the fact remains that the
worshippers would not start out with the offering in their hands,
unless they thought, to begin with, that it was acceptable. They would
not draw near to the god, with an offering about the acceptability of
which they were in doubt. Anything therefore which they conceived to
be acceptable would suffice to indicate their desire to please, and
would serve to commend them. And the desire to do that which is
pleasing to their god is there from the beginning, as the condition on
which alone they can enter his presence. Neglect of this fact may lead
us to limit unduly the potentialities contained in the rite of
sacrifice, from the beginning.

The rite did, undoubtedly, in the long course of time, come in some
communities to be regarded and practised in a spirit little better
than commercial. Sacrifices came to be regarded as gifts, or presents,
made to the god, on the understanding that _do ut des_. Commerce
itself, when analysed, is nothing but the application of the principle
of giving to get. All that is necessary, in order to reduce religion
to commercial principles, is that the payment of vows made should be
contingent on the delivery of the goods stipulated for; that the thing
offered should be regarded as payment; that the god's favour should be
considered capable of being bought. It is however in communities which
have some aptitude for commerce and have developed it,