erations. Our
Navy was ready in its place in the fighting line, and the dispatch
with which our Expeditionary Force was collected from all parts of the
kingdom, and shipped across to France, was a miracle of efficiency and
practical organisation. It is true that we had not got an Army on a
Continental scale, but it was no part of our contract that we should
have one. The fighting on land was in those days expected to be done
by our Allies, assisted by a small British force on the left flank of
the French Army. That British force was duly there, and circumstances
which were quite unforeseen made it necessary for us to undertake a
task which was no part of our original programme and create an Army
on a Continental scale, in addition to doing everything that we had
promised beforehand to a much greater extent than was in the bargain.
But in finance there was no evidence that any thought-out policy had
been arrived at in order to make the best possible use of the nation's
economic resources for the war when it came. The acute crisis in the
City which occurred in August, 1914, was a minor matter which hardly
affected the subsequent history of our war finance except by giving
dangerous evidence of the ease by which financial problems can be
apparently surmounted by the simple method of creating banking
credits. That crisis merely arose from the fact that we were so
strong financially, and had so great a hold upon the finance of other
countries in the world, that when we decided, owing to stress of war,
to leave off lending to foreigners and to call in loans that we had
made by way of accepting and bill-discounting arrangements, the whole
machinery of exchange broke down because from all over the world the
market in exchange went one way. Everybody wanted to buy bills on
London, and there were no bills to be had.
There was also the internal problem which arose because some of the
public and some of the banks took to the evil practice of hoarding
gold just at the wrong moment, and consequently there was no available
supply of legal tender currency except in the shape of Bank of England
notes, the smallest denomination of which is L5. It is known that our
bankers had long before pointed out to the Treasury that if ever a
banking crisis arose there would, or might be, this demand for a paper
currency of smaller denominations than L5; this suggestion got into a
pigeon-hole at the Treasury and was deep under the dust of Whitehal
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