be as far as ever from the solution of the problem,
'How are these physical processes connected with the facts of
consciousness?' The chasm between the two classes of phenomena would
still remain intellectually impassable."

In his latest work ("An Introduction to the Classification of Animals,")
published in 1869, Professor Huxley unhesitatingly adopts the "well
founded doctrine, that life is the cause and not the consequence of
organization." In his celebrated article "On the Physical Basis of
Life," however, he maintains, that life is a property of protoplasm, and
that protoplasm owes its properties to the nature and disposition of its
molecules. Hence he terms it "the matter of life," and believes that all
the physical properties of organized beings are due to the physical
properties of protoplasm. So far we might, perhaps, follow him, but he
does not stop here. He proceeds to bridge over that chasm which
Professor Tyndall has declared to be "intellectually impassable," and,
by means which he states to be logical, arrives at the conclusion, that
our "_thoughts are the expression of molecular changes in that matter of
life which is the source of our other vital phenomena_." Not having been
able to find any clue in Professor Huxley's writings, to the steps by
which he passes from those vital phenomena, which consist only, in their
last analysis, of movements of particles of matter, to those other
phenomena which we term thought, sensation, or consciousness; but,
knowing that so positive an expression of opinion from him will have
great weight with many persons, I shall endeavour to show, with as much
brevity as is compatible with clearness, that this theory is not only
incapable of proof, but is also, as it appears to me, inconsistent with
accurate conceptions of molecular physics. To do this, and in order
further to develop my views, I shall have to give a brief sketch of the
most recent speculations and discoveries, as to the ultimate nature and
constitution of matter.

_The Nature of Matter._

It has been long seen by the best thinkers on the subject, that
atoms,--considered as minute solid bodies from which emanate the
attractive and repulsive forces which give what we term matter its
properties,--could serve no purpose whatever; since it is universally
admitted that the supposed atoms never touch each other, and it cannot
be conceived that these homogeneous, indivisible, solid units, are
themselves the ulti