eat for the cohesion of all its parts, may begin to
increase anew and run the same course as the parent mass. This is growth
and reproduction in their simplest forms; and from such a simple
beginning it is possible to conceive a series of slight modifications of
composition, and of internal and external forces, which should
ultimately lead to the development of more complex organisms. The LIFE
of such an organism may, perhaps, be nothing added to it, but merely the
name we give to the result of a balance of internal and external forces
in maintaining the permanence of the form and structure of the
individual. The simplest conceivable form of such life would be the
dewdrop, which owes its existence to the balance between the
condensation of aqueous vapour in the atmosphere and the evaporation of
its substance. If either is in excess, it soon ceases to maintain an
individual existence. I do not maintain that vegetative life _is_ wholly
due to such a complex balance of forces, but only that it is
_conceivable_ as such.

With CONSCIOUSNESS the case is very different. Its phenomena are not
comparable with those of any kind of _matter_ subjected to any of the
known or conceivable _forces_ of nature; and we cannot _conceive_ a
gradual transition from absolute unconsciousness to consciousness, from
an unsentient organism to a sentient being. The merest rudiment of
sensation or self-consciousness is infinitely removed from absolutely
non-sentient or unconscious matter. We can conceive of no physical
addition to, or modification of, an unconscious mass which should create
consciousness; no step in the series of changes organised matter may
undergo, which should bring in sensation where there was no sensation
or power of sensation at the preceding step. It is because the things
are utterly incomparable and incommensurable that we can only conceive
of _sensation_ coming to matter from without, while _life_ may be
conceived as merely a specific combination and co-ordination of the
matter and the forces that compose the universe, and with which we are
separately acquainted. We may admit with Professor Huxley that
_protoplasm_ is the "matter of life" and the cause of organisation, but
we cannot admit or conceive that _protoplasm_ is the primary source of
sensation and consciousness, or that it can ever of itself become
_conscious_ in the same way as we may perhaps conceive that it may
become _alive_.

INDEX.

_ABRAXAS gr