rd Congress,
volume ix, page 806, an opinion expressed by the distinguished
Speaker, Mr. Blaine, which has been repeatedly alluded to to-day.

"The Clerk read as follows:

'The Chair has repeatedly ruled that pending a proposition to change
the rules dilatory motions could not be entertained, and for this
reason he has several times ruled that the right of each House to
determine what shall be its rules is an organic right expressly
given by the Constitution of the United States. The rules are the
creature of that power, and, of course, they cannot be used to
destroy that power. The House is incapable by any form of rules
of divesting itself of its inherent constitutional power to exercise
its functions to determine its own rules. Therefore the Chair has
always announced upon a proposition to change the rules of the
House he never would entertain a dilatory motion.'

"The Speaker. It will be observed that the then Speaker says he
has frequently held that pending a proposition to change the rules
dilatory motions could not be entertained. The precedents for
ruling out dilatory motions where an amendment of the rules is
under consideration are many.

"During the electoral count my immediate predecessor (Mr. Randall)
decided, in principle, the point involved here. On February 24,
1877, after an obstructive motion had been made, the following
language was used, as found in the _Record_ of the Forty-fourth
Congress, page 1906.

'The Speaker. The Chair is unable to recognize this in any other
light than as a dilatory motion.

'The mover then denied that he made the motion as such.

'The Speaker. The Chair is unable to classify it in any other way.
Therefore he rules that when the Constitution of the United States
directs anything to be done, or when the law under the Constitution
of the United States enacted in obedience thereto directs an act
of this House, it is not in order to make any motion to obstruct
or impede the execution of that injunction of the Constitution and
laws.'

"While this decision is not on the precise point, it clearly covers
the principle involved in the case with which we are now dealing.

"The Chair thinks the Constitution and the laws are higher than
any rules, and when they conflict with the rules the latter must
give way. There is not one word in the present rules, however,
which prescribes the mode of proceeding in changing the standing
rules except as to the reference of pro