positions to change the
rules, with the further exception that--

'No standing rule or order of the House shall be rescinded or
changed without one day's notice.'

"But it will be observed that there is an entire absence from all
these standing rules of anything that looks to giving directions
as to the procedure when the rule is under consideration by the
House. This only refers to the time of considering motions to
rescind or change a standing rule to the reference of propositions
submitted by members, and to the time and manner of bringing them
before the House for consideration, and not to the method of
considering them when brought before the House.

"It seems to purposely avoid saying one word as to the forms of
proceedings while considering such motions. This is highly
significant.

"There is nothing revolutionary in holding that purely dilatory
motions cannot be entertained to prevent consideration or action
on a proposition to amend the rules of the House, as this right to
make or amend the rules is an organic one essential to be exercised
preliminary to the orderly transaction of business by the House.
It would be more than absurd to hold otherwise.

"Rule XLV undertakes to fasten our present standing rules on the
present and all succeeding Congresses. It reads as follows:

'These rules shall be the rules of the House of Representatives of
the present and succeeding Congresses, unless otherwise ordered.'

"If this rule is of binding force on succeeding Congresses, and
the rules apply and can be invoked to give power to a minority in
the House to prevent their abrogation or alteration, they would be
made perpetual if only one-fifth of the members of the House so
decreed.

"The fallacy of holding that the standing rules can be held to
apply to proceedings to amend, etc., the rules will more sharply
appear when we look to the case in hand. The proposition is to so
amend the rules in contested-election cases as to take away the
right to make and repeat dilatory motions, to prevent consideration,
etc. And the same obstructive right is appealed to to prevent its
consideration. To allow this would be to hold the rules superior
not only to the House that made them but to the Constitution of
the United States.

"The wise remarks quoted in debate, made long since by the
distinguished speaker, Mr. Onslow of the House of Commons, about
the wisdom of adhering to fixed rules in legislative proceedings,
w