is generally greater than in the attack. By reason of such
a location the reserve is best able to meet a hostile enveloping
attack; it has a better position from which to make a counter attack;
it is in a better position to cover a withdrawal and permit an orderly
retreat.

The distance from firing line to reserve increases with the size of
the reserve.

500. When the situation is no longer in doubt, the reserve should be
held in rear of the flank which is most in danger or offers the best
opportunity for counterattack. Usually the same flank best suits both
purposes.

501. In exceptional cases, on broad fronts, it may be necessary to
detach a part of the reserve to protect the opposite flank. This
detachment should be the smallest consistent with its purely
protective mission.

502. The commander assigns to subordinates the front to be occupied by
them. These, in turn, subdivide the front among their next lower units
in the firing line.

503. An extended position is so divided into sections that each has,
if practicable, a field of fire naturally made distinct by the
terrain.

Unfavorable and unimportant ground will ordinarily cause gaps to exist
in the line.

504. The size of the unit occupying each section depends upon the
latter's natural strength, front, and importance. If practicable,
battalions should be kept intact and assigned as units to sections or
parts of sections.

505. Where important dead space lies in front of one section, an
adjoining section should be instructed to cover it with fire when
necessary, or machine guns should be concealed for the like purpose.

506. Advanced posts, or any other form of unnecessary dispersion,
should be avoided.

507. Unless the difficulty of moving the troops into the position be
great, most of the troops of the firing line are held in rear of it
until the infantry attack begins. The position itself is occupied by a
small garrison only, with the necessary outguards or patrols in front.

508. Fire alone can not be depended upon to stop the attack. The
troops must be determined to resort to the bayonet, if necessary.

509. If a night attack or close approach by the enemy is expected,
troops in a prepared position should strengthen the outguards and
firing line and construct as numerous and effective obstacles as
possible. Supports and local reserves should move close to the firing
line and should, with the firing line, keep bayonets fixed. If
practicable,