ood will feel that even physical
violence may be justified on occasion if it is not accompanied by hatred
toward its object.[14] However, there would be few who consider
themselves pacifists who would accept such a position.

We are again forced to the conclusion that it is violence as we have
defined it to which the pacifist objects. At this point, the chief
difference between the pacifist and the non-pacifist is that the latter
defines violence as does Clarence Case, as "the _unlawful_ or
_unregulated_ use of destructive physical force against persons or
things."[15] Under such a definition, war itself, since it is sanctioned
by law, would no longer involve violence. Thus for the non-pacifist it
is ethically acceptable to use lawful violence against unlawful
violence; for the pacifist, violence against any personality is never
ethically justified.[16]

On the other hand, a very large group of pacifists insist upon
discarding these negative definitions in favor of one that is wholly
positive. Maurice L. Rowntree has said: "The Pacifist way of life is the
way that brings into action all the sense and wisdom, all the passion of
love and goodwill that can be brought to bear upon the situation."[17]

In this study, no attempt will be made to determine which of the many
pacifist positions is most sound ethically. Before any person can make
such a determination for himself, however, it is necessary that he
understand the differences between the various approaches to the problem
of influencing other people either to do something which he believes
should be done, or to refrain from doing something which he feels ought
not to be done.

It might be helpful for us in our thinking to construct a scale at one
end of which we place violence coupled with hatred, and at the other,
dependence only upon the application of positive love and goodwill. In
the intermediate positions we might place (1) violence without hatred,
(2) non-violence practiced by necessity rather than because of
principle, (3) non-violent coercion, (4) Satyagraha and non-violent
direct action, and (5) non-resistance.

We need, at the outset, to recognize that we are speaking primarily of
the relationships between social groups rather than between individuals.
As Reinhold Niebuhr has so ably pointed out, our ethical concepts in
these two areas are greatly at variance with one another.[18] The
pacifist principles are already widely accepted as ideals in the affa