FREE BOOKS

Author's List




PREV.   NEXT  
|<   1099   1100   1101   1102   1103   1104   1105   1106   1107   1108   1109   1110   1111   1112   1113   1114   1115   1116   1117   1118   1119   1120   1121   1122   1123  
1124   1125   1126   1127   1128   1129   1130   1131   1132   1133   1134   1135   1136   1137   1138   1139   1140   1141   1142   1143   1144   1145   1146   1147   1148   >>   >|  
gh not in its mode of being. Reply Obj. 3: As Boethius [*Pseudo-Bede, Sent. Phil. ex Artist.] says, the "being of an accident is to inhere." Hence no accident is called being as if it had being, but because by it something is; hence it is said to belong to a being rather to be a being (Metaph. vii, text. 2). And because to become and to be corrupted belong to what is, properly speaking, no accident comes into being or is corrupted, but is said to come into being and to be corrupted inasmuch as its subject begins or ceases to be in act with this accident. And thus grace is said to be created inasmuch as men are created with reference to it, i.e. are given a new being out of nothing, i.e. not from merits, according to Eph. 2:10, "created in Jesus Christ in good works." ________________________ THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 110, Art. 3] Whether Grace Is the Same As Virtue? Objection 1: It would seem that grace is the same as virtue. For Augustine says (De Spir. et Lit. xiv) that "operating grace is faith that worketh by charity." But faith that worketh by charity is a virtue. Therefore grace is a virtue. Obj. 2: Further, what fits the definition, fits the defined. But the definitions of virtue given by saints and philosophers fit grace, since "it makes its subject good, and his work good," and "it is a good quality of the mind, whereby we live righteously," etc. Therefore grace is virtue. Obj. 3: Further, grace is a quality. Now it is clearly not in the _fourth_ species of quality; viz. _form_ which is the "abiding figure of things," since it does not belong to bodies. Nor is it in the _third,_ since it is not a "passion nor a passion-like quality," which is in the sensitive part of the soul, as is proved in _Physic._ viii; and grace is principally in the mind. Nor is it in the _second_ species, which is "natural power" or "impotence"; since grace is above nature and does not regard good and evil, as does natural power. Therefore it must be in the _first_ species which is "habit" or "disposition." Now habits of the mind are virtues; since even knowledge itself is a virtue after a manner, as stated above (Q. 57, AA. 1, 2). Therefore grace is the same as virtue. _On the contrary,_ If grace is a virtue, it would seem before all to be one of the three theological virtues. But grace is neither faith nor hope, for these can be without sanctifying grace. Nor is it charity, since "grace foreruns charity," as Augustine
PREV.   NEXT  
|<   1099   1100   1101   1102   1103   1104   1105   1106   1107   1108   1109   1110   1111   1112   1113   1114   1115   1116   1117   1118   1119   1120   1121   1122   1123  
1124   1125   1126   1127   1128   1129   1130   1131   1132   1133   1134   1135   1136   1137   1138   1139   1140   1141   1142   1143   1144   1145   1146   1147   1148   >>   >|  



Top keywords:

virtue

 

accident

 
charity
 

Therefore

 

quality

 

belong

 

corrupted

 
species
 

created

 

virtues


subject

 

Further

 

worketh

 

Augustine

 
natural
 

passion

 

Pseudo

 

sensitive

 

Boethius

 

proved


principally

 

Physic

 
fourth
 
Artist
 
righteously
 

impotence

 
bodies
 

things

 
figure
 
abiding

regard
 

contrary

 
theological
 
sanctifying
 

foreruns

 

disposition

 
nature
 
habits
 

manner

 
stated

knowledge

 

Christ

 

ARTICLE

 

Whether

 

merits

 

ceases

 
reference
 

speaking

 
properly
 

Virtue