gh not in its
mode of being.
Reply Obj. 3: As Boethius [*Pseudo-Bede, Sent. Phil. ex Artist.]
says, the "being of an accident is to inhere." Hence no accident is
called being as if it had being, but because by it something is;
hence it is said to belong to a being rather to be a being (Metaph.
vii, text. 2). And because to become and to be corrupted belong to
what is, properly speaking, no accident comes into being or is
corrupted, but is said to come into being and to be corrupted
inasmuch as its subject begins or ceases to be in act with this
accident. And thus grace is said to be created inasmuch as men are
created with reference to it, i.e. are given a new being out of
nothing, i.e. not from merits, according to Eph. 2:10, "created in
Jesus Christ in good works."
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THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 110, Art. 3]
Whether Grace Is the Same As Virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that grace is the same as virtue. For
Augustine says (De Spir. et Lit. xiv) that "operating grace is faith
that worketh by charity." But faith that worketh by charity is a
virtue. Therefore grace is a virtue.
Obj. 2: Further, what fits the definition, fits the defined. But the
definitions of virtue given by saints and philosophers fit grace,
since "it makes its subject good, and his work good," and "it is a
good quality of the mind, whereby we live righteously," etc.
Therefore grace is virtue.
Obj. 3: Further, grace is a quality. Now it is clearly not in the
_fourth_ species of quality; viz. _form_ which is the "abiding figure
of things," since it does not belong to bodies. Nor is it in the
_third,_ since it is not a "passion nor a passion-like quality,"
which is in the sensitive part of the soul, as is proved in _Physic._
viii; and grace is principally in the mind. Nor is it in the _second_
species, which is "natural power" or "impotence"; since grace is
above nature and does not regard good and evil, as does natural
power. Therefore it must be in the _first_ species which is "habit"
or "disposition." Now habits of the mind are virtues; since even
knowledge itself is a virtue after a manner, as stated above (Q. 57,
AA. 1, 2). Therefore grace is the same as virtue.
_On the contrary,_ If grace is a virtue, it would seem before all to
be one of the three theological virtues. But grace is neither faith
nor hope, for these can be without sanctifying grace. Nor is it
charity, since "grace foreruns charity," as Augustine
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